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Social marketing and the corruption conundrum in morocco: An exploratory analysis

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ABSTRACT

The pervading force of corruption, across the globe, remains a major concern among nations, multilateral agencies, such as Transparency International, and more profoundly in major business and public policy discourses. For many developing countries, especially those with weak institutions, high levels of corruption are causatively associated with high levels of poverty, poor economic performance and underdevelopment. This research explores the growing incidence of corruption in Morocco, which has stunted the country's positive development. This research situates the treatment of corruption within the conceptual frame of social marketing—a demonstrably robust platform for analysing societal issues and, indeed, a validated behavioural intervention model. A two-pronged data collection method was applied, based on the positivistic paradigm and involving a total of 1000 respondents – with about 792 questionnaires fully or partially completed. Data analysis was accomplished through the use of logistic regression and propensity score matching techniques to remove socio-demographics biases. Findings based on micro-level data revealed that the campaign did manage to raise awareness among the public by about 60 per cent, it also changed perceptions about corruption with a modest but significant 8.2 per cent increase among population perceiving corruption as immoral. Similarly, respondents exposed to the campaign had a 20.8 per cent higher intention to change their proclivity towards corruption compared with the population not exposed to the campaign—with family influence reported as the main predictor of intention to change.

1. Introduction

When President Jacob Zuma of South Africa was accused of corruption he demanded that the charges against him be dropped because corruption, according to him, was not a crime but merely a "Western paradigm" (News 24, 2014). For Western academics studying this phenomenon from afar, corruption might just be an interesting field of research; however, for the researcher investigating corruption while living in countries where corruption is rampant—such as Russia, Venezuela, South Africa or, in the context of this study, Morocco—it quickly becomes obvious that, far from merely being a theoretical concept, corruption is a painful reality.

In Morocco, stories of corruption are ubiquitous and victims abound. To begin, one finds oneself listening to the tales of corruption from people one meets in everyday life: taxi drivers stopped by dishonest police officers, teachers who are asked to change the grades of well-connected students, a colleague who talks about a surgeon demanding 15,000 MAD (approximately 1500 USD) from the family as they wait outside the operating theatre midway through a life-or-death surgery.. Soon one realises that there are very few ways around corruption.

The spread of corruption has not gone unnoticed by the people of Morocco. Though it is thought of as something invasive to be put up with on an everyday basis, there was hope for change with the recent Arab Spring. Having started in Tunisia, to the east of Morocco, on December 10th, 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the flame of the Arab Spring eventually reached the Kingdom of Morocco. Many Moroccans are generally wary about "things from the East" because of repeated, confrontations with Algeria on the issue of the Western Sahara as well as the Chergui, a warm, dry wind from the south eastern Sahara loaded with sand which damages crops. This time, however, it was a true hope that blew in from the East. Recently, in relation to the popular Arab Spring which started in Morocco on February 20th 2011, peo-

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ple marched and chanted in the streets, demanding an end to corruption and tyranny (Molina, 2011). A new constitution was adopted on the basis of a referendum and the newly elected government responded to popular demand by launching a massive social marketing campaign against corruption.

The main aim of Morocco's social marketing campaign was to educate people about corruption, but it was immediately and heavily criticized and judged inefficient by Transparency Maroc, the Moroccan branch of Transparency International. The campaign appears to have been designed without a proper scientific understanding of the issue, and no post-campaign impact assessment was carried out. Meanwhile, a critical look in the extant literature shows a that very little work has been on the issue of exploring social marketing vis-à-vis the notoriety of corruption (Ellis, 2019). Hence, this paper addresses this research gap in relation to Morocco as the research context.

2. Background and context

Morocco is a country in North Africa which is comparable in size to the state of California. It has two neighbouring on its land borders: Algeria to the east and Mauritania to the south, as well as two Spanish enclave cities, Ceuta and Melilla, in the north. The country is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean Sea to the north.

According to the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index, in 2005 Morocco was ranked 124th out of 177 countries, in 2011 it ranked 130th out of 186 countries and two years later in 2013 no net progress was noted with the kingdom again ranking 130th out of 187 countries. The poverty level remained high, with nine per cent of the population below the poverty line (World Bank, 2011). Furthermore, in 2006 the illiteracy rate was as high as 38.5 per cent, with a rate of 46.8 per cent for women and 31.4 per cent for men. In rural areas this rate was much higher, with over 54.4 per cent of the population being illiterate and women being affected most of all (UNESCO, 2015).

While the country boasts that it is amongst the most progressive, moderate countries in the Arab world, the fact is that its rankings remain low, below Egypt for example, in terms of human development, gender equality and political freedom (Levine, 2012). In particular, Morocco's score on the Corruption Perception Index climbed from 4.7 in 2000 (37th position) to 3.4 in 2011 (80th position) (Transparency International, 2012), in 2018 Morocco scored 43 points out of 100 on the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (73rd position out of 175 countries) In comparison, New Zealand, one of the least corrupt countries according to the Corruption Perception Index, has a score of 9.5, while neighbouring Algeria ranks 113th. The year 2012 was not a good one for Morocco as its ranking declined even further, from 80th to 88th in the global corruption ranking (Le Monde, 2012). For Greffrath and Duvenhage (2014), the changes that have been implemented are largely cosmetic, since, despite having engaged the nation in a democratic process, the Makhzen, a term which defines the King Mohammed VI and his entourage, still relies on a large nexus of people who give favours and opportunities for corruption in order to maintain political power and accumulate wealth (Michael & Nouaydi, 2009a, 2009b).

3. Corruption and Clientelism in Morocco

Clientelism, defined as buying the vote of constituencies with gifts and favours (Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013), is not a recent issue in Morocco. During the French Protectorate stability was mostly secured by maintaining a clientelistic relationship with the rural elites (Hissouf, 2016). Later the political parties which were instrumental in liberating the country from the French did not promote change, but remained entrenched in their old patron-client modus operandi.

4. The Arab Spring

Although the Arab Spring of 2011 did reach Morocco, with events from Tunisia and Egypt impacting Moroccan public opinion, the country remained fairly stable. Demonstrations took place in more than 50 cities. These were large, but nowhere near the scale of the protests that were taking place in Tunisia, for example. The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior counted fewer than 37,000 participants, although estimates from other sources were between 240,000 and 300,000 (Molina, 2011). There are a number of explanations for the relative stability of the country during this period.

First, the Moroccan monarchy had taken pre-emptive actions to reduce social discontent. Salaries were raised for civil servants, jobs were provided for unemployed graduates, benefits were granted to the unemployed, and free health care was expanded and became available to more citizens (Molina, 2011).

Second, protesters were made of various social groups, which ranged from uneducated rural Moroccans to students, professionals and religious groups who had unrelated interests, and it was therefore problematic for them to organize (Goldstone, 2011).

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the monarchy had cleverly relinquished some of its powers to the parliament over the ten years preceding the Arab Spring, unlike other regimes in the region, and had already undertaken a series of political and economic reforms, which had the effect of deflecting people's ire away from the king, so that demands were for legislative change rather than abdication (Goldstone, 2011).

5. Morocco's new government

The newly elected Prime Minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, made the fight against corruption one of his government's top priorities (Bozonnet, 2015). However, at the same time, he made it clear that the campaign against corruption would not lead to a revolution. On July 25th, 2012 on Al Jazeera a Qatari state-funded broadcaster in Doha, Qatar, Benkirane declared: "My policy against corruption, is as follows: 'God forgives what occurred in the past, and if anyone backslides, God will take revenge from him'" (Morocco World News, 2012). The United Nations supported the new Moroccan regime in developing several programs to curb corruption (Fink & Hussmann, 2013). In 2011, the parliament approved a landmark law providing protection to informers and court witnesses. In 2012 the government, supported by the World Bank, launched one of the most ambitious and large-scale social marketing campaigns ever undertaken in the kingdom. This was launched nationwide and lasted for over a year (Le Monde, 2012) and as this research shows the campaign managed to raise awareness, but fail short of changing attitudes and behavior of the Moroccan citizens.

6. Social marketing campaign to fight corruption

Social Marketing has increasingly been used to address a wide spectrum of social ills, including corruption. Van Dao Truong, Professor at the Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, counted 1423 articles published in peer-reviewed journals from 1998 to the end of August 2013 (2014). Truong also noted that Kotler and Zaltman's definition of social marketing was one of the most cited definitions:

The design, implementation and control of programs calculated to influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving considerations of product planning, pricing, communication, distribution and marketing research". (Kotler and Zaltman, p. 5)

It is important to point out that a Public Service Advertising (PSA) campaign differs from social marketing in the sense that a PSA campaign is the communication mix resulting from the application of social marketing techniques which goals were the identification of an audience, its segmentation in subgroups so that each subgroup can be precisely targeted taking into account their specific needs, motives and goals. The World Bank has long favoured social marketing in its crusade against corruption, with over 600 anti-corruption campaigns funded since 1996 (Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna, 2012). Essentially, the efficacy of such a campaign is measured against the following main principles: first of all, the campaign must spread knowledge about the issue, educate the target group, inspire an attitude change and finally generate a long-term change in behaviour (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998). Another important requirement for campaign effectiveness is that the promoter of the campaign should be credible. Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) suggested that a newly elected government might benefit from higher trust and would be more likely to enjoy the legitimacy necessary to successfully run an anti-corruption campaign. Hence, in many respects, the newly elected Moroccan government seemed to have all the legitimacy required to successfully launch an anti-corruption campaign.

The social marketing campaign was launched on December 10th, 2012, and while publicly discussing the campaign, El Guerrouj, the Minister Delegate for Public Service (Le Monde, 2012) explained that corruption was a cultural phenomenon widely present in Moroccan society and that it should be eliminated in its earliest stages. A leading Moroccan sociologist, Samira Kassimi, also supported the idea that corruption had become part of Moroccan culture (Ali, 2012).

7. Statement of the problem and research questions

This research is concerned with the social marketing anti-corruption campaign that was carried out by the newly elected PJD administration. While anti-corruption campaigns are increasingly popular, their effectiveness has not always been proven (Sampson, 2010), and it is remarkable that although the Moroccan anti-corruption campaign was an expensive one-year long effort from December 2012 to December 2013, no research has been undertaken to measure its effectiveness. Once again the current work relies on micro-level data at the level of the Moroccan citizen to investigate how effectively the campaign managed to firstly communicate with the target audience in terms of overall reach, clarity and credibility of the message and secondly alter the audience attitude and behavioral intention toward corruption. Most importantly, the work focuses on estimating the extent to which the campaign was successful in generating a shift in attitudes and intentions toward corruption. Hence the research question can be stated as follows:

- Was the social marketing anti-corruption campaign efficient in terms of reach, interest generated, comprehension of the message, credibility, recall and changes in attitudes and intentions?

8. Defining corruption

Nowadays, the definition of corruption most frequently employed by anti-corruption practitioners is that of the World Bank (Kearns, 2015). For the World Bank, corruption is defined as "the abuse of public office for private gain" (World Bank, 2000). Transparency International, the leading non-governmental anti-corruption organization, definition broadens the concept of corruption by replacing "public office" by "entrusted power", highlighting the fact that corruption could be found across society as a whole. For Transparency International, corruption is "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (TI, 2015a,b). The World Bank definition, as well as many other established definitions—such as "the abuse of public power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance" (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 2); or "the misappropriation of a public office for personal profit" (Treisman, 2007, p.213)—are by and large derived from an economic perspective on corruption with little thought to other possible perspectives of definition.

9. Social marketing campaign against corruption

The World Bank and Transparency International identified mounting awareness of the devastating consequences of corruption as the first pillar in establishing a global anti-corruption norm (Lawson, 2009). Hence social marketing was promoted as an indispensable tool for "the creation of an atmosphere in public life that discourages fraud and corruption" (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 1). For Khemani (2009), the main objectives of such a campaign are to educate, inform and prevent. In Nigeria, the objective of their campaign was to set their citizens against a complacent attitude towards corruption (Khemani, 2009). Likewise, Botswana conducted a campaign through the media using slogans declaring: "We blow the whistle on foul play". This enabled the country to heighten society's awareness of corruption and gain public support against corrupt behaviour. Similarly, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong achieved remarkable results thanks to a mass media campaign to educate Hong Kong citizens on the subject of corruption (De Speville, 1999). This campaign allowed the Commission to influence the public perception of corruption. Gradually, the campaign induced an attitude change toward corruption in the people of Hong Kong. Corruption was no longer perceived as normal behaviour, but as a crime. In mainland China, moral education has been at the heart of most anti-corruption campaigns (He, 2000), extending beyond its usual remit to include shock and theatrical fear techniques to scare potential culprits and set an example to the population (Wedman, 2005).

10. Morocco's social marketing campaign against corruption

In November 2011, following the Palace's decision to reform the constitution and grant extended rights to the Moroccan people, the citizens of the kingdom voted a new government into power. The PJD (Party for Justice and Democracy), which had based its campaign on promoting social justice, addressing corruption and strengthening the democratic agenda, won 107 out of 395 seats in parliament (BBC News, 2015). The King—as stipulated under the new constitution adopted in July 2011—had no choice but to nominate the prime minister from the winning party. In December 2011, a survey conducted throughout Morocco with a sample of 1000 people aged 18 and over asked Moroccans what the main objectives of the new government should be. Fighting corruption unambiguously came first (62 per cent of respondents), followed by healthcare with 59 per cent then education with 51 per cent (Actuel, 2015). The new Prime Minister, Abdelillah Benkirane, and his government embarked on a series of campaigns to address the issue of corruption. The United Nations International Centre for the Prevention of Crime and the new administration teamed up to launch a series of measures to curtail corruption (Al-Dahdah & Brillaud, 2008). The most recent government action against corruption took place in 2012, when a nationwide social marketing cam-

paign was launched (Le Monde, 2012). This campaign was in fact the very first social marketing campaign against corruption to be launched in Morocco targeting the petty corruption affecting the life of most Moroccan ordinary citizen.

The national education program for the fight against corruption and its prevention had two phases. The first phase, launched on December 10, 2012, lasted one year. It aimed at presenting and explaining corruption to the public. This stage of the campaign included TV announcements, radio spots, the distribution of stickers and pins and the display of posters in government and public institutions. The second stage lasted for four weeks beginning in March 2013 and included public debates about corruption (L'économiste, 2012). During this period, clips were broadcast 356 times in both French and Arabic on national television. The campaign also appeared on billboards and posters in public offices with the slogan: "Beware of Bribes" (الرشوة من وياكم) with 75 billboards displayed in Morocco's major cities and on the main roads around the country at a total cost of around 2.5 million MAD (around 280,000 USD at Dec 2013 rates, unofficial and estimated) (Nazih, 2012). In addition, in order to be able to target a large proportion of the population, the campaign's billboards presented a straightforward message in using a red 'forbidden' sign above the sentence "Beware of Bribes" (Fig. 1):

The newly elected government had won the election with a large majority and seemed to enjoy the necessary credibility to address the issue of corruption. A December 2011 survey showed that 82 per cent of Moroccan citizens had "some" or "complete" trust in the Prime Minister to lead the new government and implement the program for which he was elected (Actuel 2015). However, critics were quick to comment that the "Beware of Bribes" was too simplistic a message and would be ineffective or possibly even counterproductive.

11. The case for quantitative paradigms in corruption research

Extant literature emphasises the merits of qualitative research approach in marketing studies (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2016; Bell, Bryman, & Harley, 2019; Gbadamosi, 2019). Specifically, there is a claim that Ethnographic Research could indeed be an ideal assessment of corruption as this would provide first-hand observations of corrupt deals by impartial witnesses (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2001). Problematically, such observations are rare and could not provide a true measure of corruption as in most cases, in the public service setting, observers are not allowed. Alternatively, Qualitative Research, based on the analysis of case studies, mostly via court convictions, could be used as a gauge for corruption. However, in a country where a high level of corruption is accepted, convictions are rare and consequently the accuracy of such a measure is also questionable (Rosenfeld, Kraus, Gelfand, An, & Lin, 2014). Gloppen (2013) noted that a large proportion of surveys—such as the Afrobarometer (2010); the Latinobarometer (2010); the Eurobarometer (2012); TI (2011); GCR (2012); and the World Justice Project (2012)—reported that corruption in courts of law was extensive. Another issue with the former measurement method is that it may simply reflect the effectiveness of the judiciary system, or perhaps the police's over-zealousness to please the administration rather than the actual number of corruption cases (Goel & Nelson, 1998). Media reporting on corruption could also be an indicator of the level of corruption within a country, however, again such a measure could be subject to multiple biases, including the level of freedom enjoyed by the press or the fact that larger corruption cases pointing to high level officials may be ignored and small fish corruption cases over-reported (Andvig et al., 2001).

Hence, measuring corruption through the mere observation (ethnographies) of corrupt acts through a qualitative research of court cases and/or media coverage of corruption cases (Grounded Theory) may prove unsuitable at providing a representative sample of corrupt behaviour (Andvig et al., 2001).

Fig. 1. Anti-Corruption campaign billboard.

12. Research framework

Central to an anti-corruption social marketing campaign is the alteration of people's values, attitude and behaviour. Changing people's attitudes is of foremost importance, as attitude is a key driver of behaviour. For Crano and Prislin (2006), as cited by Bailey and Spicer (2007, p. 1464), an attitude represents an "evaluative integration of cognitions and affects experienced in relation to an object"... The Theory of Attitude Change by Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) posits that a change of attitude can only be met through a particular learning process. In the Message Learning Approach, an individual is first exposed to a given message then the message is, perhaps, being considered and found interesting or not by the individual. If the message is considered interesting, the person will try to understand its meaning and at last may or may not assimilate the message. These steps, as defined by Hovland et al. (1953), are: exposure, consideration, interest, understanding and acquisition. In the same vein, Pratkanis, Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) describe a very similar learning process dubbed: The Information Processing Approach. However, altering attitude is not a sufficient condition for altering an individual behaviour as attitude is only one of many factors determining behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975).

Nwankwo (2014) uses the image of the rhizome from Deleuze and Guattari (1994) to demonstrate that the cause of corruption in Africa is the personalization of the state power by the its civil servants. This work postulates that the corrupt civil servant, just like Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p.7) rhizome, "ceaselessly established connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles", or in other words, and as hypothesized in this work, an employee continuously navigates between his civil servant role, personal values and social norms.

To verify this hypothesis, the research focuses on two mainstream theories of human behaviour: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen 1985, 1991, 2002) and the Theories of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1988). Both theories tend to present behaviour as the outcome of complex human interaction and social practice. Fishbein and Ajzen, (1980, p.55) postulate that an individual's behaviour is determined by his or her intention to perform a

particular action. Behavioural intention is the result of the combination of distinctive factors: an individual attitude toward the behaviour and the subjective norm with respect to this potential act. Fishbein and Ajzen posit that the attitude toward the behaviour is "a person's general feeling of favourableness or unfavourableness for that behaviour" and that subjective norm is an individual's "perception that most people who are important to him think he should or should not perform the behaviour in question" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p. 55).

TRA has been applied fruitfully to forecast a large number of behavioural intentions (Hale, Householder and Greene, 2002), and, to a lesser extent, to predict unethical behaviour. Kulik, O'fallon, and Salimath (2008) used TRB to analyse the cause behind Enron's high-profile corruption scandal. Randall and Gibson (1991) used the TPB to assess ethical decision making amongst medical practitioners; they found that attitude was the main driving force behind the intention to report a corrupt colleague and that subjective norm played a lesser role. The addition of the perceived behaviour control did not increase the accuracy of the model, namely because reporting a colleague was under perceived as a purely personal decision. On the other hand, Chang (1991) showed that the TPB gave better results than the TRA in predicting the copying of pirated software and hypothesized that, in the case of corruption or computer hacking, more resources were needed and that an individual could not act independently.

In the present study however, the respondents were questioned anonymously about their intention to engage in corruption. From this construct, the respondent's answer is clearly entirely under his or her control; hence in such situations where people have entire volitional control over a given behaviour the perceived control behaviour construct becomes irrelevant (Ajzen, 1991).

13. Questionnaire design

The campaign efficiency was measured along four main axes: exposure, interest, understanding and recall. A 'yes' or 'no' answer to the question "Have you seen the campaign?" measured the respondent exposure. If a 'yes' answer was given, a series of questions was asked that measured to what extent the participants felt the campaign was easy to understand, interesting, and memorable. Each point was measured on a five point Likert scale, where one signified 'strongly disagree', two 'slightly disagree', three 'neither agree nor disagree', four 'slightly agree' and five 'strongly agree'. The operational construct for the questionnaire measuring the campaign efficiency is given in Appendix 1.

The questionnaire also measured the weight of social norms and to what extent the respondents valued the opinion of their family, their friends, and respected the authority of the state (police/judiciary) or religious authorities (imams). Each item was measured on a five point Likert scale.

Fishbein's multi-attribute model was used to measure respondent attitude towards corruption. Attitude toward behaviour is the product of an individual's belief (B) that a given behaviour will generate definite consequence, and an affective appraisal of the outcomes (E) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Both constructs (affect and belief) were measured on a five point Likert scale.

Respondents were finally asked to rate their reluctance or willingness to resist corrupt behaviour (intention towards corruption) on a five point Likert scale as a result of seeing the anti-corruption social marketing campaign.

14. Sampling and data collection

A quota sampling technique was used in an attempt to have a picture of the effect of the campaign on the Moroccan population according to age and since a large gender difference was recorded in terms of "Justifiability of Corruption" (Hamelin, El Boukhari, Nwanwko, 2017). Regarding the questionnaire, French was chosen for a number of reasons. First, French is widely spoken, understood and is one of the two written languages used in official documents, with the other being MSA (Dodson, Sterling, and Bennett, 2013). Second, though Darija is increasingly being used on billboards, TV, and social media, there is no standard writing system for it. Currently it is being written in a mix of characters from the Arabic and Latin alphabets (Dodson, Sterling, and Bennett, 2013). Lastly, the interviewers, like many people in Morocco, are more fluent in French than in Modern Standard Arabic, both of the interviewers having studied in a Moroccan university where the main language of instruction is French. In rural communities, the illiteracy rate for women averages 70 per cent (Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2012). Hence, the pollsters were often asked to translate and explain the questionnaire and record responses on behalf of the respondents in rural areas who could not read or write. The same procedure had to be carried out for respondents whose languages were only Darija or Amazigh. Distribution of the questionnaire to university students was not difficult as Moroccan universities use French as the main language of instruction.

A first batch of 30 questionnaires was printed and tested with the participation of students and non-students in the local region of Ifrane. Problematic questions were then reworded in French until they became completely unambiguous. A thousand copies of the questionnaire were printed and distributed by the two female pollsters in the cities of Marrakech, Fez, Meknes, Casablanca, Tangiers and Rabat, as well as an equal proportion in rural areas of the Middle Atlas around small villages such as Aïn Leuh, Ifrane and Azrou. The same procedure to gather data for the first questionnaire was used when the respondents were illiterate or speakers of Darija or Berber only. The respondents were business owner, self employed or work in private organisation, around potential 10 respondents were working for the governments but declined to answer the questionnaire. The questionnaire was also uploaded online using *surveymonkey.com* and *kwiksurveys.com*. No discrepancy was recorded between the data collected online and offline. Out of a thousand questionnaires, 792 (77 of which were online) were fully completed or partly completed.

15. Data analysis

The change of attitude was measured as a function of the respondent's exposure, interest, understanding, and trust levels in the campaign. Intention change was measured as a function of both the respondent attitude toward corruption as well as the norms to which a respondent may abide by. Figure 2 illustrates the model used in this research.

16. Mathematical model

The respondent's attitude was defined by Ajzen and Fishbein, (1975) as such:

A is the corruption attitude score, Bi is the cognitive evaluation about the significance of corruption and Ei is the emotional weight (like or dislike) towards the associated belief.

Wilkie and Pessemier (1973) evidenced that a condition for an attitude score to be meaningful is that the number of attributes tested should be exhaustive (Wilkie and Pessemier, 1973). The cognitive map about corruption was established from the literature review and confirmed in a focus group.

The beliefs are listed below, and were measured on a Likert scale (1 min, 5 max), while affect was measured on a 6 point (−3 to +3) Likert scale.



Fig. 2. Structural model of corruption intention (TRA model).

B1 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean offering money, E1 = Affective Evaluation B1

B2 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean a gift, E2 = Affective Evaluation of B2

B3 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean offering a service, E3 = Affective Evaluation of B3

B4 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting money, E4 = Affective Evaluation of B4

B5 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting a gift, E5 = Affective Evaluation of B5

B6 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption mean accepting a service, E6 = Affective Evaluation of B6

B7 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption can be considered as authorized, E7 = Affective Evaluation set to +1

B8 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption is unlawful, E8 = Affective Evaluation set to -1

B9 = Cognitive evaluation: corruption denotes an immoral action, E9 = Affective Evaluation -1

NB: When the affective evaluation of one or more of the statement in B1 to B7 is positive (score from 1 to +3), the attitude score increases, meaning that the respondents have a more lenient attitude toward corruption, whereas a respondent will be less tolerant toward corruption if the affective evaluation of one or more of the beliefs in B1 to B7 is negative or decreases.

The null hypothesis $H_{0Campaign,}$ "corruption intention is not altered by the efficacy of the campaign", can be expressed as:

$$Intention = \varepsilon + \beta_1\ exposure + \beta_2\ interest + \beta_3\ comprehension + \beta_4\ recall + \beta_5\ credility$$

The null hypothesis, $H_{0intention,}$ attitude towards corruption and social norm do not impact corruption intent is described by the relation:

$$Intention = \varepsilon + \beta_1\ Attitude + \beta_2\ Social\ Norm$$

17. Propensity score matching

Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is a statistical technique initially designed to evaluate the causal effect of a treatment based on non-random samples, as is the case in this research. PSM was originally introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). They stated that, while it is possible to evaluate the causal effect of a treatment by comparing the effect of the treatment on two probability samples, one treated sample and one untreated sample, this is not possible if the samples are non-probability samples. In the former case, direct comparison will lead to uncertain results because subjects from the treated group may differ substantially from subjects from the untreated group, and, therefore, the observed difference in outcomes may either be due to the treatment or dissimilarities in the subject's characteristics themselves. Hence, to obtain meaningful results, both groups, treated and untreated, should be similar in term of all variables that may affect the outcome—except, of course, for the recipient of the treatment itself.

In this study, PSM was used to remove the effect of confounding variables when comparing the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on a non-probability sample. Once each respondent had a calculated *predicted* probability of being exposed to the campaign, other respondents within the sample with similar characteristics and probabilities—based on whether or not they had seen the campaign—were identified and the difference in answers to questions from the questionnaire were compared.

18. Data presentation and analysis

The vast majority of the surveyed population (52 per cent) described their monthly earnings as 150 USD or fewer; a modest sum of money to subsist on for such an amount of time. The other 48 percent reported the following: 19.6 per cent earned between 151 and 300 USD, 6.9 per cent earned between 301 and 500 USD, 5.9 per cent earned between 501 and 700 USD, 7.6 per cent earned between 701 and 900 USD, 2.5 per cent earned between 901 and 1100 USD while only two per cent reported they earned between 1101–1300 USD. 4.2 per cent of the public who were approached responded in the questionnaire that their earnings amounted to an excess of 1300 USD. 11.3 per cent of those questioned claimed single status; 70 per cent described themselves as married; 11.3 per cent were single; and divorcees, widows and widowers made the 18.7 per cent remainder. Regarding gender 437 respondents were male (55.5 per cent) and 350 respondents were female (44.5 per cent). Respondent level of education: 0.7 per cent admit-

ted having no education, two per cent attended Koranic school, 14.8 per cent went to primary school, 24.7 per cent attended secondary school, 30.5 per cent completed two years of University (DEUG Diploma), 21.1 per cent had earned a bachelors degree, 4.3 per cent were at Master level or equivalent, and two per cent reported being at PhD level. Regarding age, 170 respondents (or 21.5 per cent) were below the age of 21, 366 (or 46.4 per cent) were between 21 and 30 years old, 187 (or 23.7 per cent) were between 31 and 40 years old, and 59 respondents (7.5 per cent) were between 41 and 50 years old and 0.9 per cent or seven respondents were older than 50.

19. Descriptive statistics: campaign awareness

19.1. Exposure

The majority (68.3 per cent) of the respondents reported having seen the anti-corruption social marketing campaign slogans or clips on television or radio; leaving quite a high segment of individuals (31.7 per cent) who did not seem to notice the campaign.

19.2. Comprehension

Most respondents answered that they understood the campaign's aims and objectives very well with 41.6 per cent responding positively to this, a further 18.9 per cent maintained that they understood the messages. The second largest percentage group (19.3 per cent) did not understand the message at all, 10.2 per cent claimed that they did not understand and a sizeable proportion (9.9 per cent) was undecided.

19.3. Interest

Over 39 per cent of the respondents did not find the campaign interesting and slightly less found the campaign of interest (36 per cent). A significant percentage (23.9 per cent) did not wish to take sides

19.4. Perception of the campaign effectiveness

There was a highly cynical view of the campaign's effectiveness with a relatively low percentage of respondents considering the campaign effective in any way at all (around 30 per cent). A large segment, which comprised 29 per cent of those questioned, was neutral. The largest group remained pessimistic with 40 per cent of the respondents deeming the campaign inefficient or completely inefficient.

19.5. Recall

35.4 per cent of the public as surveyed using the questionnaire reported some recollection of the content of the anti-corruption campaign, however quite a striking majority had little or no recollection of it (43 per cent). There was also a large segment (21.7 per cent) of the population that was unsure whether they could remember the content of it or not.

19.6. Credibility of the campaign's promoter

Here, the percentage of those proclaiming full trust in the campaign promoters, and hence, by extension, the government, proved very low with 17.7 per cent espousing this view. 12.6 per cent agreed that the campaign providers were credible; while 24.5 per cent felt uncertain. The highest percentage group was those with no faith in the credibility of the government whatsoever (29.7 per cent) while those with a minimal perception of government credibility represented 15.6 per cent of the surveyed total, overall 45.3 per cent of respondents stated not to trust the government.

19.7. Change in beliefs towards corruption

To gain a better picture of what people's views were of corruption in light of the anti-corruption campaign, a questionnaire was used to elicit definitions of corruption as viewed by the Moroccan public. Respondents were asked to define their feelings about corruption in the form of a concurrence (5) or disagreement (1) (on a five-point Likert scale) to a statement concerning corruption.

An ANOVA test was carried out in order to produce a number that would infer whether or not the views of those who had seen the anti-corruption campaign differed significantly from those who had not (comparing the mean standard deviation of the two aforementioned groups). Responses with high P values exhibit no statistically significant difference in attitude between those exposed and unexposed. Table 1 demonstrates that there is no significant difference in responses to questions, except where respondents were asked about the status of corruption as an *immoral* or *illegal* act. Those who were exposed to the campaign also showed quite markedly that they considered corruption *gift-giving*. As expected to some degree, corruption was defined by both groups (not exposed/exposed) as *giving/receiving money*, a *gift or service*.

19.8. Change in attitude score

The Fishbein model as stated above was used to calculate an *attitude score* for corruption. A high attitude score indicates a person/group with a more tolerant perception of corruption, while a low score demonstrates that an individual (or several) believe that corruption is something negative. The average attitude (Calculted as $= \sum_i BiEi$) score for those not exposed to the campaign (232 respondents) was −7.19 and those exposed to the anti-corruption publicity was −11.13 for the remaining 496 individuals; therefore, attitudes of those who saw the anti-corruption publicity campaign were affected by the information and subsequently demonstrated a lower tolerance of corruption (reduction of *attitude*

Table 1
Change in beliefs toward corruption versus exposure to the campaign.

What is the meaning of corruption? (1 Totally disagree to 5 Totally agree)	Average (Did not see the campaign)/ Stddev.	Average (Seen the campaign)/ Stddev	ANOVA test and P_{value}
Giving a gift is normal	3.33/1.61	3.52/1.46	P = 0.093, insignificant difference
Accepting money	3.13/1.56	3.13/1.60	P = 0.982, insignificant
Providing a service	3.14/1.51	3.18/1.57	p = 0.613, insignificant
Receiving a gift	3.13/1.53	3.18/1.60	P = 0.607, insignificant
Paying money to someone	3.21/1.58	3.18/1.63	P = 0.911, insignificant
Offering a gift	2.92/1.58	3.20/1.58	P = 0.022, F (1, 786) = 5.30
Offering a Service	3.03/1.53	3.26/1.58	P = 0.068, insignificant
Corruption is lawful	2.38/1.42	2.45/1.52	P = 0.553, insignificant
Corruption is prohibited	3.00/1.57	3.43/1.54	P = 0.0001, F (1, 790) = 14.13
Corruption is amoral	3.08/1.538	3.48/1.53	P = 0.0059, F (1, 788) = 11.87

score by 3.94, or 2.98 per cent). The standard error for this information was 2.49 and t-statistics were −1.58.

19.9. Change in intention

An ANOVA test was also carried out to evaluate the difference between those exposed/unexposed with regard to their willingness to change corrupt behaviour (Table 2). It appears from the results that those exposed to the campaign showed more willingness to change, with a significantly higher mean score from respondents: F (1, 786) = 84.02, p = 0.0000. as per the Table 2 below:

20. Analytical statistics

20.1. Attitude toward corruption versus campaign awareness and credibility

The attitude scores obtained previously can be considered as a continuous variable since it varies between −69 to +63 (Mauer and Pierce, 1998). Setting prob the p value to 0.05 (i.e. with a 95 per cent confidence level), a significant relationship between the final attitude score and the campaign's awareness and credibility was found.

The questions pertaining to comprehension of the message and recall (p values 0.006 and 0.052 respectively) produce a significant negative correlation with the attitude score. Hence respondent increased understanding of the campaign leads to a lesser attitude score (higher rejection of corruption). Campaign provider's credibility (p = 0.000) was found to be positively correlated to the attitude score.

Thus an increased trust in the government appears to produce a higher attitude score (higher tolerance toward a corruption). An R^2 was calculated at 10.68 per cent to account for the variability of responses around the mean (Table 3)

Hence the following relationship is established:

Attitude toward corruption = -2.413 (Understood the campaign) – 2.110 (Remember the campaign) + 2.749 (Trust the government).

Government trust and attitude score findings were further corroborated by an ANOVA analysis. There was a significant effect of government trust on attitude score at the p < 0.05 level with [F (4, 787) = 7.99, p = 0]. Respondents with *no trust* or *no trust at all* in their government have low corruption attitude scores (i.e. higher aversion toward corruption) while respondents who *trust* or *completely trust* their government are less hostile toward corruption.

20.2. Propensity score matching methods

Propensity scores were estimated and the balancing property test was found acceptable for all the dependent variables. The result of the PSM analysis is provided by the average Treatment effect on the treated or the ATT score. In this study the "Treatment" is indeed the exposure to the anti-corruption mass-media campaign.

Table 2
Intention to change corrupt behaviour versus campaign exposure.

Respondents intention to change behaviour toward corruption	Occurrence	Average score (out of 5)	Standard Deviation
Did not see the campaign	245	2.316	1.308
Saw the campaign	543	3.300	1.430
Total	788	3.000	1.465

Table 3
Regression of Corruption attitude score versus campaign efficiency.

Attitude score (n = 787 respondents, Prob F > 0) with −69 <= score <= + 63	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>|t|
Saw the campaign	3.237	2.863	0.259 – not significant
Campaign is interesting	−1.093	1.079	0.311 – not significant
Understood the campaign	−2.413	0.852	0.005 – Significant
Remember the campaign	−2.110	1.066	0.048 – Significant
Trust the government	2.749	0.652	0 – Significant

20.3. Nearest score matching (NN): intention to change behaviour

Next (Table 4), both respondents who have seen the campaign and those who reported not having seen the campaign and who received (near) identical propensity scores from the intersected region between lowest and highest propensity score for each group of respondents were matched using nearest score matching (NN).

As discovered previously, respondents exposed to the campaign emerged with a higher intention to change behaviour: 3.30 versus 2.26 or 20.8 per cent more resolved to change behaviour than those who did not see it. The significant t-statistic of 6.1 clearly demonstrates this (Table 4):

20.4. Respondent alteration in attitude score

In the same vein, the nearest neighbour propensity score produced an ATT of −9.605. The mean attitude change derived from this was −12.70 or −12.6/132 = -9.6 per cent. The model also proved significant with t = −2.32.

20.5. Respondent alteration of beliefs

What also emerged using propensity score matching was that the part of the sample who saw the campaign did espouse the view more strongly that corruption was *unlawful* (+0.421 or +8.39 per cent). The significance level here was 1.88. There was also a marginal increase in the understanding that corruption was an *amoral* behaviour (0.411, or an 8.19 per cent increase; significance level: 1.94). There was no noteworthy difference between exposed/unexposed respondents when questioned whether corruption was *authorized* or not.

21. Assessing the anti-corruption campaign effectiveness: discussion

21.1. Reach and perceived effectiveness

Undoubtedly, the reach of the campaign was a success with over 60 per cent of the respondents corroborating their exposure to the campaign. However, most respondents rated the campaign as ineffective, with 29 per cent of those questioned rating the campaign as neither effective nor ineffective, and the majority, 40 per cent of the respondents, evaluated the campaign as either "inefficient" or "completely inefficient". It is worth noting that nearly a third of the respondent chose to stand on the gate and rated the campaign as neither effective or ineffective. Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) showed that fear was a major factor impacting people wanting to get involved in any discourse about corruption. Fear of retaliation or losing their job was seen as a major deterrent to reporting corruption or even discussing corruption in public. In this context it is likely for neutrality to be biased toward the

Table 4
Measurement of respondent alteration in intention to change behaviour using NNPSM method.

Variable	Respondent Demographics	Have seen the campaign (494 respondents)	Have not seen the campaign (230 respondents)	Difference between have seen and have not seen	Standard Error	T-statistics
Intention to alter behaviour (1 not at all to 5 very much so)	Not matched	3.303	2.331	0.971	0.110	8.83
Intention to alter behaviour (1 not at all to 5 very much so)	Matched with ATT	3.303	2.262	1.040	0.170	6.105

inefficient rating (Nederhof, 1987). Lang (2006) defines Public Service Advertising (PSA) perceived effectiveness as the construct of claim strength and emotional content. Claim is the verbal content of the message (in this case "Beware of Bribes"), while "claim strength" refers to the perceived effectiveness assessments of a verbal claim. Claim strength or the effectiveness of the message has been shown to be linked to the message itself.

In line with the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion of Petty and Cacioppo (2012), "strong" claims are messages that are more carefully considered by the recipient, while "weak" claims are messages considered only superficially by the recipient. Morocco's anti-corruption campaign message has indeed been poorly rated. Abdessamad Saddouq, the Secretary General of Transparency International Morocco, qualified the anti-corruption campaign as being an affront to Moroccan citizens. "The content is poor," he said, and "It is an insult to the intelligence of Moroccans" (L'economiste, 2012a).

21.2. Campaign effectiveness and government credibility

Although a survey undertaken by the magazine *Actuel* in December 2011 showed that 82 per cent of Moroccan citizens have "somewhat" or "complete" trust in the Prime Minister to lead the new government and implement the program for which he was elected (Actuel, 2015), data from this research offers a more critical picture. An astonishing 45 per cent of the eight hundred respondents questioned affirmed having "no faith" or "no faith whatsoever" in their government—to which one should also consider the 24 per cent of respondents who chose not to voice their opinion. Further analysis using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test showed that government credibility and the public's negative attitude toward corruption are negatively linked [$F(4, 787) = 7.99$, $p = 0$]. In other words, respondents with a lower level of faith in the government tend to be less tolerant towards corruption while a higher level of acceptance toward corruption is linked to a higher level of government trust.

These findings should be paralleled with the findings of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) who analysed crime patterns in the United States of America. They used a model of social interaction to show that crime is contagious and that individuals are more inclined to commit crime in an environment where the level of criminality is high. Dong, Dulleck, and Torgler (2012) used the Theory of Contagion (or Pro-Social Behaviour) to show that the perception that others might be corrupt leads to a more sympathetic attitude towards corrupt behaviour. "Thus, a person's willingness to be corrupt depends on the pro-social behaviour of other citizens. Hence in the case of Morocco this social contagion effect seems to take its roots in the Makhzen who with its local representatives are the sole decision makers in the country (Malki, 2018). The contagion gradually spreads to each administrative structure in the country down to the smallest level of bureaucracy.

21.3. Campaign design, recall and attitude change

Reach and Perceived Effectiveness are only preliminary gauges to measure the effectiveness of a social marketing campaign. The effectiveness of a campaign should be measured against the goals of that campaign—in this case, an alteration of attitude and behaviour toward corruption. This study showed that exposure to the campaign led to a decrease in the respondent tolerance of corruption. Using propensity score matching, attitude scores decreased from −1.534 out of 132 for the unexposed to −11.139 out of 132 for the exposed, that is a 9.6 per cent decrease in tolerance of corruption. Of course, attitude change is not a straightforward process. The route to attitude change passes through the following stages: Exposure, Interest, Comprehension and Retention (Hovland et al., 1953). Although 60.0 per cent of our sample confirmed they felt they had a good understanding of the campaign, only 30.1 per cent of the respondents thought the campaign was interesting. Regarding comprehension, most respondents (60.3 per cent) claimed they understood the message "well" or "very well", yet next to a third of the sample (29.6 per cent) declared they did not understand the message. Finally, fewer than 25 per cent reported they could remember the campaign—with a majority of respondents (over 65 per cent) saying they could not remember the message or were unsure whether or not they could recall it.

Clearly, the anti-corruption campaign failed to generate interest and maintain retention among Moroccan citizens. There are several possible reasons for this. The Memory-Based Information Processing Theory postulates that recall is an essential initial step for behavioural change to take place, since recall leads to potential attitude change and subsequently attitude change may lead to a behavioural change (Choi & Lee, 2013). In a seminal paper entitled: "The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion" (or ELM), Petty and Cacioppo (2012) maintained that the degree of mental processing of the message is linked to the recipient's level of persuasion and, consequently, linked to attitude change. The authors distinguish two routes to persuasion: the central route (which reflects a deeper processing of the message leading to a long lasting attitude change) and a peripheral route (where the message is only superficially processed and leads to a transient attitude change). In the same vein, the low level of recall reported—with only one quarter of the respondents recalling the campaign's message—can be attributed to the manner in which the audience processes the message.

21.4. Campaign impact on beliefs about corruption

Morocco's anti-corruption campaign resulted in predominantly poor outcomes regarding the change in citizen belief towards corruption. Propensity Score Matching showed that respondent beliefs about corruption being authorized or not authorized remained unchanged, with a significant portion of the sample (20.15 per cent) reporting they did not know if corruption was or was not authorized. Furthermore, a staggering 23 per cent of the respondents felt that corruption was authorized.

The belief that corruption is an illegitimate act was not significantly improved either. On average, the score of the respondents, concerning the illegal nature of corruption, increased from 2.99 to 3.41 out of 5, or a meagre 8.4 per cent increase. Although the percentage of respondents who "agreed" or "agreed entirely" with the fact that corruption was illegal was measured at 38.6 per cent for those unexposed and at 50 per cent for those exposed.

Levine (2005) analyses the psychic meaning of corruption and reveals that corruption cannot be linked to a breakdown in morality, but rather a failure of the individual to disengage from its "rapacious self". For Levine, an immoral corrupt act can be perceived as both a potential for social condemnation but also as a fast track to better economic standing and thus social acceptance (Levine, 2005). If we consider the argument of Bayley (1966)—that the corruption in developing countries is often a necessary means for a poorly paid civil servant to reassert his or her social standing in a traditional society (Andvig, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2001)—and Skalli (2001), who investigated the issue of poverty in Morocco and has broadened the term "poverty" to include "social exclusion", we can find how a corrupt individual might thus be unable to perceive him or herself as such because in these spheres corruption is not seen as an immoral act but rather a means to gain economic advantage and consequently social acceptance or a means for survival given the poverty of certain groups (Levenets, Stepurko, Pavlova, & Groot, 2019). With the concept that corruption can be seen on a broader level in rampantly corrupt countries as another way in which to climb the socioeconomic ladder, one can see how Morocco's anti-corruption campaign may have provided the necessary awakening to a sense of morality.

21.5. Behavioural change and social norm

The impact of the campaign on the intention to change corrupt behaviour was recorded and higher than expected. Intention to change behaviour went from 2.26 out of 5 for those unexposed to 3.30 out of 5 for those who had been exposed to the campaign, a 20.8 per cent increase in respondent intention to change his or her intentions for the better. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) stipulates that intention results from the influence of an individual attitude toward the outcome of a given behaviour and the perception of what others, the "social norm", think about this intended behaviour.

The results of the regression show that both the attitudes and the opinion of the family have a significant impact on intention to change behaviour. Attitude was found to be a significant, although marginal, predictor of intention. A less tolerant attitude to corruption leads to an increased intention to change behaviour. The main predictor of intention change was reported to be the influence of the family. Family is the strongest normative force as the findings show. Other aspects of social norms—such as judgment of friends or the imam, fear of the rule or public shaming via media exposure—failed to record any correlation with the change of intention towards corruption.

Law enforcement may intuitively appear to be a good deterrent to corruption. Fisman and Miguel (2007) showed that the higher the fine, the less unethical the behaviour manifested; however, this theory is invalid when the law enforcers are themselves corrupt. A corrupt police officer, by corrupt acts such as lowering the payment of the fine, dilutes the dissuasion of violating the law (Polinsky & Shavell, 2001).

There may be various reasons why religious authority is not perceived as a deterrent to corruption. Although Islam condemns corruption (Qur'an 2:188), it remains highly hierarchical, alongside other religions, such as Eastern Orthodoxy or Catholicism, and as such has been found to be linked to a higher level of perceived corruption (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). Also, specific to Morocco, religious authorities operate under the strict control of the government. Following the terrorist attacks of 2003 in Casablanca, imams across the breadth of the country were required to have their Friday sermon approved by the Ministry of the Interior. Imams are thus under government control and, as such, suffer from the same low level of credibility as the government (Hamelin, et al., 2010).

The Theory of Reasoned Action revealed that family opinion was the chief predictor of a respondent's intention to change corrupt behaviour while other social norms were found to be uncorrelated. As in many other African countries, Moroccan social norms revolve around one main value: shame. For Sayer, "shame" is defined as: "An important mechanism in the production of social order, for through it people internalize expectations, norms, and ideals and discipline and punish themselves," (Sayer, 2005 as cited by Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014). For Jaffe et al. (2014), shame has biological roots since it plays an important role both in enhancing social cohesion and trust. For De Sardan (1999), "shame is a key traditional tool for social control in Africa," (p. 46). These findings also seem to support the important contribution made by Benedict (2004) who distinguished "shame" from "guilt". While shame results from violating cultural or social values, guilt on the other hand results from the feeling of having violated one's own personal value Benedict (2004). This distinction could shade light on the Moroccan context, where corruption was found to be very marginally perceived as immoral. Hence if shame was shown to act as a deterrent to corruption within the family unit, it has little impact away from the family unit as a corrupt behaviour does not go against one's personal value (it is not perceived as immoral).

22. Conclusion on the campaign effectiveness

The campaign's lack of creativity led to low interest and recall from the respondents. This in turn led to a low level of elaboration or mental processing from the audience; hence the campaign failed to persuade a sizeable percentage of the audience that corruption was illegal. Campaign efficiency was also weakened by the low trust respondents noted for their government, the campaign provider. However, the campaign did manage to convince the majority of respondents that corruption was immoral. When corruption is widespread, it infiltrates and merges into the culture. Corruption becomes a modus operandi and—as fear of poverty and social exclusion dominate—fear of reprobation no longer acts as a deterrent to corrupt practices; instead, these corrupt practices become the social norm as they offer a shortcut to economic security and social acceptance. Due to religious affairs being under government control and police forces being perceived as highly corrupt, neither were found to have had an impact on reducing corrupt intention. Finally, the Theory of Reasoned Action proved to be an acute predictor of corrupt intention and family opinion was found to have the highest impact as a deterrent to corruption. Hence unless the Moroccan citizens become deeply persuaded that corruption is immoral and that such believe becomes part of its personal value, corruption will continue to be pervasive.

23. Policy recommendation: strong political will, a necessary stepping stone to an efficient social marketing campaigns

Citizen trust in the government is an essential factor when it comes to fighting corruption (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998) and since Moroccan citizen support for the newly elected administration had rapidly deteriorated after the 2011 election (Desrues, 2013) any effort by the government to address corruption was destined to fail. Lack of trust was identified as a major limitation to government efforts to fight corruption. As Uslaner posited, "Societies with more trust and less corruption have better governance, stronger economic growth, spend more on redistribution and have greater respect for the law among the citizenry" (Uslaner, 2004, p. 3). A way to palliate citizen wariness would be to set up an authentically independent body to address corruption. This was successfully done in Hong Kong (De Speville, 1999) and in Singapore. Article 6 from the United Nations Convention against Corruption

recommends, as a chief measure, the creation of a "tailor-made AC investigation and prosecution system (Article 36) that has the powers and resources to pursue all cases without fear or favour, has the 'necessary independence' and can resist political interference (Article 6)" (Painter, 2014). In the same vein, Article 20 of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption suggests the creation of dedicated and independent bodies to fight corruption (De Sousa, 2010). Although Singapore's Corruption Prevention and Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has the power to investigate any minister or senior civil servant and do so, its level of independence is questionable since its main office resides in the Prime Minister's office (Painter, 2014). For Painter, the chief reason why the CPIB has historically been so successful in its task is not because it is truly an independent body, but rather because it originates from a strong political will to curb corruption. One may then question Benkirane's true dedication in fighting corruption when he declared: "My policy against corruption is as follows: 'God forgives what occurred in the past, and if anyone backslides, God will take revenge from him'" (Morocco World News, 2012). The government anti-corruption campaign which suggested that "citizens are the sole persons responsible for corruption and petty corruption" (L'economiste, 2012a) and consistently avoided to prosecute senior level civil servants was, for Moroccan public opinion, further signs that the Prime Minister's commitment to truly tackle the issue was mostly cosmetic in nature.

Hence as Rosenbaum, Billinger, and Stieglitz (2013) posited, top-down reform—such as harsher penal sentences aimed at increasing the risk of a dishonest transaction—might be needed. So despite widespread evidence of the potency of social marketing campaigns, at this early stage of development one should question the opportunity of launching the campaign.

24. Advancing democracy and fostering social capital

The poor efficiency of the campaign observed in this study raises the question as to the suitability of a social marketing campaign at this early stage of democracy, freedom of the press and citizen rights. The kingdom's relatively early move to establish democracy has preserved the country from the chaos experienced by many countries following the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. However, the palace has been accused of maintaining its hold on the country, mostly through the implementation of cosmetic measures, and corruption is still an endemic and an everyday threat to the economic and social stability of the country. For Morocco, advancing democracy—as a concept of enhancing most aspects of a country's social life—might be fundamental to efficiently tackle corruption. In a democratic system, openness is the norm. Corrupt acts can be exposed by the press without penal risks, whistleblowers are granted legal protection and the overall risk for a corrupt agent to be uncovered and charged is greater (Treisman, 2000). Morocco has, over recent years, embarked on a path to democracy. Time is required for a culture of openness to become the norm and as Treisman (2000) states, it is not the degree of democracy, but rather the duration of uninterrupted democracy, that is linked to lower levels of corruption. Hence, as Morocco strengthens its democratic institutions, corruption should gradually decline.

Social media has been instrumental to the mobilization of the Moroccan population and had led to some of the successes of the February 20 Movement in 2011 (Zaid, 2016). Previously, the palace, under King Hassan II, had exercised strict control over the media and mostly used it to promote the regime (Zaid, 2016). Under the reign of Mohamed VI, the modernization and liberation of the telecommunication sector was permitted. The kingdom saw an exponential growth of Internet penetration. Facebook, the dominant social media channel in Morocco, grew to around 10 million Moroccan accounts in 2015 compared to 860,000 in 2009 (Zaid, 2016). In many aspects, social media, since it has reached such a large swath of the population, contributes to the creation of a norm. The February 20th movement, with its cry to moralise public life and end corruption, contributed to the awakening of Moroccan moral values and heightened Moroccan society's aversion to corruption. Just as the "Targuist Sniper" raised public awareness about corruption in the police forces by uploading videos of policemen demanding bribes from motorists (the Targuist Sniper video's were viewed over a million times, Hibou & Tozy, 2009), the Moroccan government, via an active presence on social media, could open a dialogue with the general public, increase transparency and ultimately regain the trust of their citizens.

Credit authorship contribution statement

Nicolas Hamelin: Conceptualization, Methodology, Data curation, Writing - original draft, Visualization, Investigation. **Sonny Nwankwo:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Visualization, Investigation, Supervision. **Ayantunji Gbadamosi:** Visualization, Investigation, Writing- Reviewing and Editing.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Appendix I. Operational construct for the questionnaire measuring the campaign efficiency

Constructs	Reference	Survey Items
Cognitive		Rate your understanding of corruption: Corruption is a standard occurrence Corruption is unlawful Corruption is an amoral Corruption is approved in morocco Corruption is the receiving money Corruption is taking - obtaining a gift (2 questions) Corruption is accepting - providing a service (2 questions)(Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 (Agree entirely)
Affect		Affective evaluation of the above: (Totally Dislike) –2 –1 0 1 2 (I tolerate)
Social Norms		I value the judgment of my family – friends – Iman: (Do not Consider at all) 1 2 3 4 5 (Totally value) Respect for the justice or the police authority: (No respect at all) 1 2 3 4 5 (Totally respect their authority)
Attitude scores	(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980)	Computed with the values from the questions above A = © Cognitive × Affect
Campaign Awareness	**(**Hovland et al., 1953**)**	I am aware of the anti-corruption-campaign: no or yes I understand the message in the campaign I think the campaign is interesting I can recall the campaign(completely disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 (Totally agree)
Campaign Effectiveness		This campaign will change things (Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 (Very much) This campaign is efficient (Not at all) 1 2 3 4 5 (Very much)
Campaign provider credibility		I trust the Government (Completely disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 (Completely agree)
Intention Toward Corruption		I think I will alter my behaviour regarding a corrupt behavior (Will stay the same) 1 2 3 4 5 (Will change)
Demographic		**Q16:** you are: 1 Male 2 Female **Q17:** are you? 1 Single 2 Married 3 Divorced **Q18:** Maximum instruction standard you reached 1 no education 2 Koranic School 3 Primary School 4 College level 5 Bachelor degree 6 Master Degree 7 Doctorate **Q19:** How old are you: 1 Less than 20 years 2 Between 21 and 30 3 Between 31 and 40 4 Between 41 and 50 5 More than 50 **Q20:** What is the approximate revenue of your family: 1 Less than 1500 Dhs 5Between 7001 and 9000 Dhs 2 Between 1501 and 3000 Dhs 6Between 9001 and 11000 Dhs 3 Between 3001 and 5000 Dh 7Between 11000 and 13000 Dhs 4 Between 5001 and 7000 Dhs 8More than 13,000 Dhs **Q21:** What do you do in life? 1 Seeking work 2 Student 3 Retired 4 Employee 5 Self-employed 6 Others **Q22:** Household Size: 1) 2 persons or less 2) From 3 to 5 3) 6 or more **Q23:** Do you feel your neighbour is? 1 richer than you 2 Same 3 We are better off. **Q24:** Where do you live? 1 Fez 2 Casablanca 3 Agadir 4 Meknes 5 Tetouan 6 Marrakech 7 Rabat 8 Tangier 9 Other

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